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GENERAL STATEMENT REGARDING BRIEF 
It is not Frontier/Layton1s intention or purpose to address 
all of the points raised in Thiokolfs brief. To the extent that 
a particular argument or issue is not dealt with in this brief that 
should not be deemed as a waiver or concession on any point. 
Frontier/Layton believes that those issues have been argued 
adequately in their principal brief. 
Frontier/Layton further recognize that most of the issues 
addressed in this reply brief were addressed in their principal 
brief. However, because Thiokol is once again arguing its case 
under the Federal holding of Weeks Dredging Contracting, Inc. v. 
U.S., 13 CI. Ct. 193 (1987), afffd 861 F. 2d 728 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 
some points need to be further clarified in terms of that analysis. 
In addition, Thiokolfs brief, in some instances, states only half 
of the issues or incorrectly states the issues and a clarification 
is in order. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE BORING LOGS WERE PART OF THE 
CONTRACT DOCUMENTS 
Thiokolfs statement of Issue No. 1 that "the logs . . . were 
not part of the contract, and were provided for information only.11 
(P.l Issue 1 Statement of the Issues), and again Thiokol!s 
statement "(3) [t]hat they [boring logs] were not part of the 
contract documents," (p.18 Thiokol Brief) [words added] are both 
inaccurate and misleading statements and are contrary to Thiokolfs 
own statements in its brief. Perhaps Thiokol has confused the 
1 
soils report which was not included in the contract documents with 
the boring logs which were included. If one looks at Thiokolfs 
parenthetical statement of the facts at 2(e) it says "copy of the 
log of soil borings from a building site over 1400 feet away is 
included with the specif ications.ff [emphasis added]. That 
statement clearly suggests that the boring logs were included with 
the specifications which are a part of the contract documents. 
Further, at paragraph 9, clause 2, Thiokol says "although two 
boring logs were provided with the specifications, those logs came 
from the M-191 site, 1400 feet south of the project site and 
specifications clearly identify that fact." [emphasis added]. 
Therefore, once again Thiokol concedes that the boring logs 
were included in the contract documents. Perhaps the best 
evidence that Thiokol knew or should have known that this 
provision was included in the contract is its own statement at the 
end of the undisputed facts. Fact No. 1 states: "1. Thiokol and 
Layton executed a purchase order/contract (^purchase order1) dated 
July 17, 1986, which included specifications (Nspecificationsf) 
for the construction of the project." (R. at Page 5, Thiokol fs 
Brief. 
In its memorandum decision the Court states at page 2: 
[t]he Court notes that the plans and specifications did 
include a representation that soil borings of a 
representative area near the building site have been 
taken by Chen and Associates. It is conceded by all 
parties that a copy of the boring logs was included which 
showed the exact location of the boring site which was 
over 1000 feet away from the site in question. [emphasis 
added]. (R.1169) 
Section 02010 Paragraph 101 has been reproduced in its 
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entirety below because the provision must be construed in its 
entirety to understand the case. Clearly the boring logs were part 
of the contract documents. 
SECTION 02010 
SUBSURFACE INVESTIGATIONS 
PART 1 - GENERAL 
1.01 DESCRIPTION 
A. Soil borings of a representative area 
near the building site have been taken by 
Chen & Associates, Salt Lake City, UT. 
B. A copy of the boring logs is included. 
C. The soils report was obtained only for 
the Engineers use in the design and is 
not a part of the Contract Documents. 
The log of borings is provided for 
Contractors1 information but is not a 
warrant of subsurface conditions. 
(R.at Exhibit C Appelletefs Brief) 
Whenever bits and pieces of this provision from the contract 
are asserted by Thiokol, Frontier/Layton would ask the Court to 
view such selective treatment of the language in view of the whole 
contract provision. 
POINT II: POINTS OF CLARIFICATION AND NOTEWORTHINESS 
While it is not Frontier/Layton1 s purpose to try to correct 
every misstatement or understatement contained in Thiokol's Brief 
because such, in many instances, is merely advocacy, they do 
believe some major issues which might influence the Courtfs 
analysis, need to be addressed. 
A. THIOKOL'S CONTRACT DOCUMENTS STATE THAT THE BORING LOGS 
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WERE OF A REPRESENTATIVE AREA NEAR THE SITE. 
After a careful reading of Thiokolfs brief it appears that 
the words "of a representative area near the building site11 do not 
appear anywhere in the body of its brief. That clause is 
axiomatic to Frontier/Layton1s claim that the plans and 
specifications were misleading. It is Frontier/Layton1s main 
contention that the boring logs taken from M-191 are not 
representative of the M-193 area. M-191 had clays, sands and 
silts while M-193 had cobbles and gravels. Consequently, this 
clause is misleading and inaccurate as a guide for what a 
contractor would have reasonably expected to find at M-193. 
B. AN AFFIRMATIVE STATEMENT WAS MADE. 
Throughout its brief Thiokol takes the position that the 
trial court ruled that Thiokol did not make an affirmative 
statement. Upon several readings of the Court's memorandum 
decision, we believe that one can only conclude that the Court 
determined that there was an affirmative representation, but that 
it was accurate or in the alternative that the Court did not reach 
the question of whether there was an affirmative representation 
and simply reasoned that even if there was an affirmative 
statement the disclaimer overcame it. In numbered paragraph one 
(1) of the Court's memorandum decision the court states: "Even if 
the provisions of the contract are considered to indicate that a 
soil boring presented is a Arepresentativef area, there is a 
specific disclaimer indicating the use to which that information 
is to be put." (R. 1170) Perhaps a more accurate 
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characterization of the memorandum decision is that the Court 
focused on the disclaimer and it was not important to the Court's 
analysis whether or not there was an affirmative statement. Under 
Frontier/Layton's view of the applicable law, it does not matter 
if there was an affirmative statement or not. Parson talks about 
misleading plans and specifications not affirmative statements. 
Perhaps this Honorable Court may determine that a misleading plan 
or specification can not exist without a misleading affirmative 
statement, but that is not a stated element of the criteria set 
out in Parson. In any event, the statement that the boring logs 
were "of a representative area near the building site" is 
obviously an affirmative statement. 
C. WERE THE BORING LOGS "DISTANT" OR "NEAR". 
As a subissue, Thiokol states at page 21 of its brief "the 
boring logs were from a distant site." The contract documents say 
"boring logs of a representative area near the building site have 
been taken" (R. at Thiokolfs brief page 21) [emphasis added]. 
While it is agreed that M-191 is approximately 1400 feet away it 
is obvious that minds differ on the objective meaning of the term 
"near." The real issue is not whether 1400 feet is near or far 
from the building site but whether the boring logs were misleading 
and whether or not Frontier Foundations was entitled to rely on 
those boring logs when preparing its bid. By stating that the 
boring logs were taken from a representative area near the 
building site, Thiokol manifested an intent to have the 
contractors rely on this representation. 
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POINT III: WHICH LAW GOVERNS 
Once again, Thiokol resorts to arguing its case based on 
Federal Law including Weeks Dredging Contracting, Inc. v. U.S., 13 
CI. Ct. 193 1987, afffd 861 F. 2d 728 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The facts 
that give rise to the instant lawsuit indicate that it is a claim 
for Type 1 differing site conditions for a private contract in the 
State of Utah. A Federal Court's interpretation of Federal 
Acquisition Regulation 52:236-2 is not determinative. The 
differing site conditions clause in question is a typical one. 
This Honorable Court should apply the law as set forth in Parson 
arid Thorn and there is no reason to do otherwise. 
Frontier/Layton agree that this is a case of first impression for 
a Utah Appellate Court and accordingly asks for a written opinion 
from the Appellate Court so that the citizens of Utah have a clear 
statement of the law. However, the issue that is of first 
impression before the Court is the "private" versus "public" 
contract distinction and not the interpretation of Federal 
Acquisition Regulation 52:236-2 and 52:236-3. The Utah Supreme 
Court cases of Jack B. Parson Const. Co. v. State of Utah 
Department of Transportation, 725 P.2d 614 (Utah 1986) and Thorn 
Construction Company, Inc. vs. Utah Department of Transportation, 
598 P.2d 365 (Utah 1979) each dealt with a Type 1 differing site 
conditions claim. Although both cases involved public contracts, 
Frontier/Layton assert that the statement of law contained in 
Parson is the appropriate standard for a Type 1 differing site 
claim in Utah, whether for a public or private contract, and is as 
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follows: 
A contractor of public works who, acting reasonably, is 
misled by incorrect plans and specifications issued by 
the public authorities as the basis for bids and who, as 
a result, submits a bid which is lower than he would have 
otherwise made may recover [damages] in a contract 
action. 
Id at 616. 
Thiokol's position seems to be that because the boring logs 
came from somewhere other than the project site itself that under 
the holding of Weeks there can be no misleading statement and hence 
no differing conditions. Conversely, Parson and Thorn set the 
standard that a contractor may recover if he is "misled by 
incorrect plans and specifications" that were issued as a basis for 
bid. Parson at 616. Parson and Thorn are the law governing Type 
I differing site conditions clause in this jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, Weeks is distinguishable upon its facts. 
Weeks was a case where the plaintiff, Weeks Dredging, had 
contracted with the Corps of Army Engineers to dredge a channel in 
a harbor on what was called the Tennessee-Tombigee Waterway (Tenn-
Tom). The reason the Court ruled against Weeks was because it 
failed to prove that the changed conditions it allegedly 
encountered were actually at the project site. The case had 
nothing to do with whether boring logs from another dredging 
location had been included in the plans and specifications, but 
rather where in fact changed conditions were encountered. 
To understand the Weeks case, basic terminology and background 
is essential. The contract amount was determined by cubic yards 
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of material to be dredged. The dredged material was broken down 
into pay yardage and non-pay yardage. As the term suggests, the 
contractor got paid for pay yardage and did not get paid for non-
pay yardage. When the Corps of Engineers determined what channel 
depth and configuration it wanted in the lfTenn-Tomlf waterway, it 
created what was called the minimum pay template, which is what the 
bottom of the waterway needed to conform to regarding depth and 
width, to conform with the contract. The Corps realizes that in 
order to effect the minimum pay template, that the contractor was 
going to have to do some overdredging and so they allowed for some 
amount of overdredging on the bottom and sides to effect the 
minimum pay template. This overdredging amount was called the 
maximum pay template, in other words, the maximum the Corps was 
going to pay to effect the minimum of what it needed. Anything 
beyond the scope of the maximum pay template was overdredging of 
what was previously called non-pay yardage. 
When Weeks set about performing its contract, it took daily 
samples of the material that it encountered. It did not 
distinguish between which materials had come from outside the 
maximum pay template, or non-pay yardage, and material which had 
come from inside the maximum pay template, for which Weeks could 
have been compensated. Because of essentially Weeks1 sloppy 
sampling and classification of samples, the Court held Weeks had 
failed to prove its case because it had failed to prove that the 
changed conditions existed within the contract site, i.e. the 
maximum pay template. There was no way for the Court to 
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distinguish between dredged materials that had been dredged outside 
of the project site and those that had been dredged inside the 
project site. Hence the language "at the project site11, that 
occasionally appears in the Weeks holding and presumably Thiokol's 
usage of it in the instant case. However, the Court specifically 
states in language quoted hereinafter, that the case was really not 
about misleading plans and specifications, but was rather about the 
failure to provide adequate proof. The critical language in Weeks 
Dredging Contracting, Inc. v. U.S., 13 CI. Ct. 193 1987, afffd 861 
F. 2d 728 (Fed. Cir. 1988) that illustrates its nonapplicability 
to the facts of the instant case is as follows: 
At closing arguments, the defendant focused its primary 
argument(s) from the foregoing (while not abandoning the same) 
and now emphasizes what it perceived to be a more fundamental 
failure of proof by the plaintiff. According to the 
defendant, it is a simple fact that plaintiff's case is 
fatally flawed in that all of plaintiff's proof relates to an 
alleged differing site condition occurring at the wrong site. 
Instead of posturing its differing site condition claim by 
comparing the various estimated materials within the contract 
site (i.e., the maximum pay template) with the same categories 
of materials actually dredged in that same contract site (as 
it must), plaintiff erroneously compared, avers defendant, the 
categories of estimated materials within the maximum pay 
template, with the categories of materials actually dredged 
in the contract site plus an area of admitted 2 0 to 2 5% 
overdredging occurring outside of the contract site. 
Plaintiff's failure to factor out the quantum of "non-pay" 
materials it dredged outside the maximum pay template, from 
the "pay" materials it dredged within the contract site, 
leaves the Court with no relevant comparative basis by which 
to test for the existence of any material differing site 
condition occurring within the relevant contract site. . . . 
. . . After thoroughly reviewing all of the evidence in 
the record, we are of the opinion that plaintiff is not 
entitled to an equitable adjustment based on differing site 
conditions for excess gravel, excess cutaw, and oversize 
gravel. While all of our reasons for this decision are set 
out more fully below, the primary, but not the only, basis 
for our decision is the failure of proof. In essence, try as 
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we did to find probative evidence in the record which would 
permit us to make a valid comparison between materials 
expected (indicated by the IFB) and materials truly dredged, 
all within the actual contract area, we are forced to conclude 
that plaintiff has simply failed to adduce fundamental proof 
of the latter element, i.e., the quantum of the various 
materials actually dredged within the relevant contract 
(maximum pay template) area. . . . [Emphasis Added]. 
Id. at 197. 
Weeks further states: 
At the outset we noted, and now re-emphasize, that while 
this is a Type I differing site condition case, it is not, in 
major part, one which seeks equitable adjustment because the 
subsurface materials actually encountered subsurface materials 
actually encountered differed materially in character and 
nature from the subsurface materials depicted in the contract 
documents. Here, plaintiff contests the nature of the 
subsurface materials only as to the minor extent it allegedly 
encountered gravel larger in size than that depicted in the 
contract documents. [Emphasis in original]. 
Id. at 217. 
If you were comparing apples to apples between the instant 
case and the Weeks case, Frontier/Layton would have to be making 
a claim for sheet piles that had been driven at some location other 
than the site location of M-193. This is not what this case is 
about. Frontier/Layton1s claim, simply stated, is that defendant 
included reports of subsurface conditions which were characterized 
as being representative of the contract area. Those plans and 
specifications were misleading and inaccurate and thus caused 
Frontier/Layton to submit a bid lower than it otherwise would have. 
This case is not about Frontier/Layton making a claim for changed 
conditions on work that it completed outside of the contract site. 
It should be noted, however, that Parson and Thorn have no such "at 
the project site" language in them, but rather talk in terms of 
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misleading plans or specifications. 
Therefore, Weeks, in its bare essentials, does not apply to 
the facts of this case or to the purpose for which defendant 
purports to assert it. For that reason, if no other, Weeks should 
be discarded. However, an even more compelling reason to discard 
Weeks is because it is not the law of this jurisdiction. Parson 
and Thorn are the law of this jurisdiction and the paragraph of 
Parson above quoted is the standard that applies for a changed 
condition claim in the State of Utah. 
POINT IV: THIOKOL'S DISCLAIMER DOES NOT 
OVERCOME THE INCLUSION OF INACCURATE 
AND MISLEADING INFORMATION 
Once again Thiokol resorts to using Federal Law citing P.J. 
Maffei Bldg. Wrecking Corp. v. U.S., 732 F.2d 913 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
when in fact our own Utah Supreme Court in Parson and Thorn has 
spoken on the matter. In both Parson and Thorn a State Agency had 
given or withheld information regarding the suitability of borrow 
pits for highway construction projects. In both instances the 
borrow material proved not appropriate. Jack B. Parson Const. Co. 
v. State of Utah Department of Transportation, 725 P.2d 614 (Utah 
1986) analyzed it as follows: 
UDOT asserts that, assuming there were errors on the 
sheets, the information there presented was not 
misleading if considered together with other available 
information. And UDOT asserts that a bidder is 
chargeable with constructive knowledge of any information 
it could have obtained by contacting prior contractors 
and by searching the state's files. Information 
available from these sources would have put sheets 2B and 
44 in perspective and resulted in an accurate picture of 
the prospects. To support this claim of a general duty 
to inquire and the consequent assertion of constructive 
knowledge, UDOT relies on a general disclaimer and a 
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reference in the contract documents to the availability 
of other materials. As Thorn held, a general disclaimer 
or reference to other materials is ineffective to qualify 
a specific misleading representation; the general duty 
such a disclaimer imposes is superseded by a specific, 
positive misstatement, and the bidder is not required to 
search further for the facts. Thorn Construction co. v. 
Utah Department of Transportation, 598 P. 2d at 367-68; 
cf. L.A. Young Sons Construction Co. v. County of Tooele, 
575 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1978) (no evidence of 
misrepresentation of critical fact). 
This Court's refusal in Thorn to permit a general 
disclaimer to impose a requirement that a bidder must 
investigate the state's specific affirmative 
representations to determine their truth has a sound 
basis in policy. Permitting a bidder to rely upon 
affirmative statements will place responsibility for the 
accuracy of bidding information on the party best suited 
to determine whether it is misleading—the state. 11 
also obviates the necessity for bidders to pad their bids 
to protect against unexpected costs that may be incurred 
as a result of carelessly prepared plans and 
specifications. On the other hand, the rule urged upon 
us by UDOT can only be expected to encourage sloppy work 
by those preparing plans and specifications and to 
increase the cost of state projects, for no better reason 
than to relieve the state's employees of any duty to be 
accurate in representing facts known to them. [Emphasis 
added]. 
Id. at 617. 
The operative language from Thorn Construction Company, Inc. 
vs. Utah Department of Transportation, 598 P.2d 365 (Utah 1979) 
which dealt with a circumstance similar to that of Parson is as 
follows: 
It was held that the contractor was entitled to rely on 
the representation made, notwithstanding the existence 
of general language in another section of the contracts 
requiring the contractor to satisfy himself as to the 
character, quality and quantity of surface and subsurface 
materials were obstacles to be encountered. f if [omitting 
citations emphasis added] 
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There is little or no difference between what occurred in this 
case and what happened in Parson and Thorn. 
When Thiokol's argument is boiled down to its essence it is 
no different than what the state was trying to argue in Parson. 
Thiokol seems to be saying that because the disclaimer was included 
that Frontier/Layton had no right to rely on the affirmative 
statement regarding the boring logs, but rather was burdened with 
the responsibility to search further for the truth. In its brief 
at paragraph 2 of the statement of undisputed facts, Thiokol seems 
to be advancing some of the same arguments advanced by the State 
in Parson. 
c. The contractor shall make every effort to 
familiarize himself with prevailing work conditions and 
is not relieved from responsibility for performing work 
without additional cost to Thiokol by his failure to do 
so. Specifications, General Requirements at Paragraph 
1.11; FAR 52.236-3. (R. 544). 
d. Prior to starting work, the contractor will 
become familiar with site conditions concerning 
excavation, filling and grading. Specifications, 
Excavation, Filling and Grading at 3.01(A). (R.545). 
Furthermore, Thiokol has argued strenuously that because of 
Mr. Liu's training, some constructive knowledge or other duty was 
imposed on Frontier/Layton. 
The boring logs have very specific, affirmative, identifiable 
information that was unquestionably included in the contract 
documents. Disclaimers regarding those boring logs and general 
reference to other provisions in the contract do not supercede the 
inclusion of the information. 
The whole of Thiokolfs argument seems to be that if 
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Frontier/Layton had any doubts about the accuracy of the boring 
logs they should have done something on their own to check it out. 
To suggest that Frontier/Layton should have done something more or 
something different to ascertain the veracity of the 
representations made about the boring logs is contrary to existing 
law. In its simplest form, that is what the disclaimer argument 
is about. Should Frontier/Layton have done something different to 
prove the accuracy of the boring logs that were included or were 
they entitled to rely on them? The record indicates that there was 
no other information about subsurface soil conditions. Further, 
there is no evidence that any other contractors performed their own 
subsurface soils testing prior to bidding. The record does include 
at least the testimony of Robert Weyher of Weyher Brothers 
Construction, who bid the project with the intent of doing their 
own pile driving, and he specifically stated that he did not do any 
subsurface testing (Robert Frederick Weyher Deposition, Pages 14, 
line 10 to 15, line 10 at Record, Exhibit E to Frontier/Laytonf s 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, R. 
569-594). Clearly, the law announced in Parson and Thorn as well 
as other cases indicates that a contractor is entitled to rely on 
information that is included in contract documents. 
As Justice Zimmerman stated it in Parson quoted above, there 
are good policy reasons why contractors ought to be able to rely 
on the information provided in bid documents. It is not in the 
best interest of the public for contractors to bid every project 
based on a worst case scenario. 
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Tooele, 575 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1978) cited by Thiokol is of no help 
to its case. Simply stated, and as noted in the analysis of 
Parson, L.A. Young is distinguishable on its facts. In L.A. Young 
the Court specifically found that the water table information was 
not part of the contract documents and, even if it had been part 
of the contract documents the information was an accurate statement 
of the circumstances from where the test information was taken. 
Finally, there were no statements in L.A. Young made that the 
information in question represented conditions at the project site. 
Therefore, L.A. Young is distinguishable because the Court found 
that the information in question in that case was not included in 
the contract documents and no statements were made that the 
information in question represented conditions at the site. 
Thiokol essentially argues that because the boring logs were 
accurate for M-191, where they were taken, that this case squares 
up with the L.A. Young holding. However, that analysis totally 
ignores the contract language which states that "boring logs of a 
representative area near the building site were taken11. Therefore, 
the boring logs, while representative for M-191, were not 
representative for M-193, the contract site, as they were purported 
to be. 
POINT V: FRONTIER/LAYTONf S RELIANCE WAS 
REASONABLE 
Thiokol argues because (1) the boring logs were taken from a 
"distant site" (page 21 Thiokol brief), (2) Jim McLean said that 
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conditions can change in as little as 10 feet (R. 125 Deposition 
of Peter Roderick McLean, pages 27-28), and because (3) Mr. Liu 
said that he did not interpret the contract documents to say that 
M-191 would be "identical" (R. 123 Deposition of Jeong "Julian" 
S. Liu, page 27-28) that there could have been no reasonable 
reliance. 
First, Mr. McLean did not bid this job for Frontier 
Foundations. Thiokol recognizes this fact in paragraph 5 of its 
statement of the facts. Thiokol said Mr. Liu bid the job. Mr. 
McLean was a drilling supervisor. Mr. Liu, who has vastly 
superior technical training in the area of soils conditions, was 
the party responsible for making the bid for Frontier Foundations. 
Mr. Liu stated that because the soils information, which 
includes the boring logs, was good enough for the engineer who 
designed the sheet pile system, it was good enough to bid the 
project. The engineer intrinsically relies on the same kind of 
information to design the sheet pile system as does the sheet pile 
driver who bids the project. (R. 123 Deposition of Jeong "Julian" 
S. Liu, page 20). Further, Mr. Liu in his deposition stated that 
because the M-193 site was higher and further away from the creek 
bed than was the M-191 site, that he would expect conditions more 
favorable not less favorable. (R. 123 Deposition of Jeong 
"Julian" S. Liu, page 21, 22 abd 23) 
Obviously, Thiokol believed the conditions at the location of 
the boring logs were representative of the conditions of the M-193 
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site or they would not have said the logs were from a 
representative area. If Thiokol!s engineers believed it and 
relied on it to design the sheet pile system, why should 
Frontier/Layton be expected to do otherwise. It should be noted 
that when the differing conditions were encountered, Thiokol chose 
to believe that the site had been "seeded" (R. 469) rather than to 
believe that gravel and cobble had actually been encountered. 
Thiokol obviously did not expect gravel and cobble and were very 
surprised that it was encountered. 
Jim Nordquist the engineer for Chen and Associates, which did 
the field testing for the boring logs in question, stated in his 
affidavit that is was reasonable for Frontier/Layton to rely on 
the boring logs and that they really had no practical choice but 
to do so. (R. at Exhibit K to Frontier/Layton! s Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at Pages 569-594). 
Robert Weyher stated in his deposition that his company, 
Weyher Brothers, bid this job planning to do their own sheet pile 
work. Weyher Brothers did not do any independent field 
investigation in preparation of its bid to Thiokol but rather 
relied on the information provided by the boring logs to prepare 
its bid. (R. at Exhibit E to Brief of Appellant at Page 15). 
The issue is not whether the boring logs were "distant" as 
Thiokol now characterizes them or "near" as the contract documents 
state, or whether in fact Mr. Liu thought they would be identical 
or not. The issue is whether it was reasonable for 
Frontier/Layton to assume the boring logs were representative of 
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the conditions to be encountered. Thiokol said they were 
representative and Frontier/Layton strongly believed and relied on 
them. In view of the current case law on disclaimers and public 
policy as stated by Justice Zimmermanfs statement in Parson at 
page 617, Thiokol must not be allowed to escape liability for 
these representations. Reliance was reasonable. 







GRANTED FOR FRONTIER/LAYTON 
In the final paragraph of Thiokolfs Brief Point III and in 
the beginning of its Point IV it talks about the appropriateness 
of determining reasonable reliance and other elements in a Type 1 
differing sites claim at Summary Judgment. Thiokol attempts to 
analyze the appropriateness of the Court's ruling in this case on 
the elements of the Weeks case. Weeks is not the law of this 
jurisdiction. Frontier/Layton assert that Parson and Thorn are 
the law of this jurisdiction. Parson in its simplest elements 
state that a contractor can make out a claim for a Type 1 
differing site conditions if (1) there were misleading plans and 
specifications; (2) the contractor reasonably relied on those 
misleading plans and specifications; and (3) was damaged because 
they caused him to submit a bid lower than he otherwise would 
have. 
Element I: The bid documents included boring logs of a 
"representative area near the building site.11 Whether they were 
"near" as the contract documents indicate or "distant" as Thiokol 
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would have us now believe because they were 14 00 feet away is not 
the dispositive issue. They were included and they were 
misleading. 
Element II: The next question is whether Frontier!s reliance 
on the contract documents was reasonable. The boring logs were all 
that were given about the subsoil conditions. They were part of 
the soils report and were intended for the engineers to rely on 
when designing the project. Engineers use substantially the same 
kind of information to design a project as a contractor needs to 
bid a project site. M-193 was higher and further away from the 
creek bed than M-191. This would suggest more favorable not less 
favorable conditions. Three experts, Mr. Liu, Mr. Weyher and Mr. 
Nordquist have confirmed that it was reasonable to rely on the 
boring logs. Public policy as announced by Justice Zimmerman 
suggests that the responsibility for veracity ought to rest with 
the owner and not the contractor for the accuracy of the 
information contained in its bid documents. The testimony of Mr. 
McLean, who was never involved in bidding this project for 
Frontier Foundations, and the disclaimer relied on by Thiokol are 
not sufficient to establish Thiokol!s position that 
Frontier/Layton acted unreasonably and thus take this case out of 
the realm of reasonable reliance. 
Element III: Frontier/Layton left the issue of damages to be 
determined by the trial Court and did not make it a matter of its 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. However, there is no 
question that the job took substantially longer and required 
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different, more costly, methods and techniques to complete the 
project than would have been required if the conditions would have 
been sands, clays and silts as was represented in the bid 
documents rather than the gravels and cobbles that were found. 
Frontier/Layton urge that there was ample testimony, even 
construing all of the testimony in a light most favorable to 
Thiokol, to grant summary judgment in favor of Frontier/Layton. 
Conversely, in view of the expert testimony and public policy 
reasons offered by Frontier/Layton, at a very minimum there were 
factual issues raised under the analysis advanced by Thiokol which 
should have barred Thiokolfs Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Consequently, there was sufficient evidence to grant 
Frontier/Layton1s motion and Thiokolfs motion should not have been 
granted. 
CONCLUSION 
Frontier/Layton assert that the law of this jurisdiction 
regarding Type 1 differing site conditions is Parson and Thorn. 
Under Parson the elements of a differing site claim reduced to 
simple elements are as follows: (1) misleading plans and 
specifications; (2) detrimental reasonable reliance upon the 
misleading plans and specifications; and (3) damages. 
Frontier/Layton asserts that it has met its burden to show 
entitlement under Parson to a Type 1 differing site condition 
claim, reserving the issue of damages for trial. 
Frontier/Layton asserts that it is not whether the boring 
logs were "distant" as Thiokol would now have us believe or 
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"near", as the contract documents state, but whether the 
terminology "boring logs of a representative area near the site11 
was misleading. Reliance on the boring logs was reasonable in 
light of the expert testimony and case law on disclaimers and 
public policy as announced in Parson. 
In accordance herewith Frontier/Layton respectfully asks the 
Court to reverse the decision of the trial court which granted 
Thiokol's Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Frontier/Layton1s 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with instructions for the 
trial court to grant Frontier/Layton1s Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment as to the entitlement question with the issue of damages 
to be reserved for trial. 
DATED this f)-/ day of February, 1991. 
Attorney for Appellants 
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